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Most countries around the world use the value-added tax (VAT) as their primary indirect 
tax, and most countries have thresholds -  based on turnover, the value of goods and 
services a business provides -  below which businesses do not need to register for VAT. In 
the EU, all but two countries (Spain and Sweden) have  registration thresholds. The UK’s 
threshold of £81,000 is the EU’s highest, and is perceived as a way for the government to 
reduce the compliance costs of small businesses not wishing to register for the VAT. 
However, thresholds are generally much higher in countries that have more recently 
introduced a VAT, such as Singapore, which currently has a threshold of about 540,000 Euro. 
  
In the wake of the financial crisis, many governments have also tended to turn to VAT to fill 
in the hole in the public finances, either by increasing the standard VAT rate or lowering the 
registration threshold. It is a prime target; in the UK, for instance, VAT generates 21 percent 
of total tax revenue, ranking it only behind income tax and national insurance contributions 
as the largest source of tax revenue. Generally, registration involves an increase in tax 
liability for the firm, and also compliance costs, which may not be trivial.  For example, in 
the UK, compliance costs for a firm with turnover at the VAT threshold are estimated to be 
around 1-2% of turnover, and the cost may be higher in other countries.  
 
Thus, a key question to inform policy-making is how the VAT itself and, in particular, the 
registration threshold affect the behavior of small firms. We aim to understand the 
efficiency and welfare costs of VAT by analysing three important, behavioral responses to 
the registration threshold:  voluntary registration, bunching, and growth effects.  
  
Voluntary registration makes the VAT unique amongst all the major taxes. It refers to a 
situation where a firm registers for VAT even if it is below the turnover threshold, and thus 
not required to do so. This is likely to occur when a firm has large purchases of intermediate 
inputs, and/or they can pass most of VAT on output onto the purchaser. In this case, it may 
be profitable to voluntarily register for VAT so the firm can claim back input tax, while 
passing some or most of the burden of the output tax on to the purchaser. In our 
comprehensive UK data-set,, further described below, over 44% of companies in the UK 
with turnover below the threshold register voluntarily. 
 
However, not all firms are in this position. A small trader selling services to households, such 
as a plumber or electrician, might have relatively small purchases of intermediate inputs, 
and face elastic demand from purchasers, who themselves cannot claim back the VAT that 
they pay.  In this kind of case, bunching occurs,  where a firm keeps its reported taxable 
turnover just below the registration threshold either legally, by restricting its scale of 
operations, or illegally, by misreporting sales. Growth effects are related to bunching, and 
occur where the firm restricts its scale of growth in order to keep below the threshold, and 
also possibly has a higher rate of ‘catch-up’ growth when it decides to register.  
 
Several papers in the academic and policy literature have argued conceptually that 
voluntary registration, bunching and growth effects might exist. For example,  the ground-
breaking VAT model by Keen and Mintz (2004) found bunching below the threshold, and a 
hole above where firms do not locate. However, voluntary registration is never optimal in 
their model because none of the burden of output VAT can be passed on to purchasers. 
Brashares et. al. (2014) discuss some of the possible determinants of voluntary registration 
and bunching in their calibration of the Keen-Mintz model to US data, but they are unable to 
test the predictions with data because the US has no VAT. To date, no work has yet 
established to what extent these effects actually occur, their magnitudes, and their 
determinants for a country where VAT is in place.  
 
To fill in these gaps,  we develop a conceptual framework for studying the two key aspects 
of behavioral response to VAT, including voluntary registration and bunching, and we test 
this framework using UK firm-level data on tax returns and firm characteristics.  
We show that voluntary registration is more likely in two scenarios: when either the cost of 
inputs relative to sales is high, or  when the proportion of business-to-consumer (B2C) sales 
is low. In the first scenario, when input costs are important, registration allows the firm to 
claim back a considerable amount of input VAT. In the second,  if most customers are VAT-
registered, the burden of an increase VAT can easily be passed on in the form of a higher 
price, because the customer himself can claim back the increase.  
 
We show that the determinants of bunching at the registration threshold are the same as 
for voluntary registration, with the signs of the effects reversed. Specifically, bunching is 
more likely when the cost of inputs relative to sales is low, or when the proportion of B2C 
sales is high. We also show that the elasticity of value-added of registered firms with respect 
to the effective VAT rate can be recovered from an implicit function that relates the degree 
of bunching to the elasticity of value-added, a formula very similar to that of Kleven and 
Waseem (2013), who analysed notches in the personal income tax. 
 
Finally, we show in the conceptual framework that the elasticity of value-added can be 
related in a simple way to the deadweight loss of a small increase in the statutory rate of 
VAT, thus extending the well-known results of Feldstein (1999) and Chetty (2009) to an 
indirect tax setting.  
 
We bring these predictions to an administrative data-set created by linking the population 
of corporation and VAT tax records in the UK, which includes 1,408,517 observations for 
435,688 companies between April 1, 2004 and March 30, 2010. We show that the empirical 
pattern of voluntary registration is consistent with the theory. In particular, voluntary 
registration is more likely with a low share of B2C sales or a high share of input costs.1  
Quantitatively, the probability that a firm voluntarily registers for VAT is increased by 0.05 
for a one standard deviation increase in the share of B2C sales and by 0.02-0.05 for a one 
standard deviation increase in the input cost ratio. 
 
We then look at bunching. To get a feel for the data, Figure 1 below shows a histogram of 
the distribution of firm turnover, pooling data across all years. To allow comparison across 
years, we measure turnover in deviations from the threshold in any given year. As the Figure 
shows, there is clear evidence of bunching at the VAT threshold, shown by the dotted line, 
                                                          
1
  
which is mainly driven by growing firms. This is the first evidence, to our knowledge, that a 
VAT notch leads to bunching.  
 
Figure 1. Bunching Below the VAT Notch 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigating further, we find that firms are more likely to bunch at the threshold when 
either the cost of inputs relative to sales is high, or when the proportion of B2C sales is low, 
consistently with the theory. So, there is a clear pattern of heterogeneity in bunching. 
The next question concerns how firms bunch; that is, what are the mechanism(s) at work? 
One possibility is that they genuinely restrict their sales to stay below the threshold. If so, 
the distribution of input-cost ratio should be smooth around the VAT notch. We provide 
some suggestive evidence that part of bunching is driven by under-reporting of sales. 
Specifically, we find that the salary-inclusive input-cost ratio moves in the parallel direction 
between the registered and non-registered group outside the bunching region but starts to 
increase substantially for the non-registered companies just below the threshold. We 
interpret the large and sharp increase in the salary-inclusive input-cost ratio to be partly 
driven by the fact that it is costly to underreport salary expenses due to third-party 
reporting. 
 
In ongoing work, we are addressing the effects of the registration threshold on small firm 
growth. There is a vast empirical literature on the determinants of small-to-medium 
enterprise (SME) growth, but relatively little attention has been given to the role of ‘tax 
notches’ such as VAT registration. If we consider the analog of Figure 1 just for firms that are 
growing, we see that bunching is much sharper, suggesting that the threshold might inhibit 
firm growth.   
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Figure 2. Bunching by Growing Firms 
 
 
We find that  firms with turnover below the VAT threshold that are not registered for VAT 
have a significantly lower growth rate than a ‘control group’ of firms below the threshold 
that are voluntarily registered for VAT (and thus do not have a tax cost of registration). 
Firms that cross the VAT threshold in a given year have a higher growth rate in that year 
than a control group of firms already above the threshold. Moreover, these effects are 
stronger, the closer the ‘treated’ firms are to the threshold.   
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